A single compromised testing platform turned some of the world's most trusted websites into malware delivery points on Monday, 16 November 2026. Attackers planted malicious JavaScript inside Optimizely Web, a widely used A/B testing tool, and the poisoned code reached visitors of 178 organisations — including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock — for roughly 17 hours before it was purged. (CybersecurityNews)

The campaign, dubbed OPTIMJACK by independent researcher Amirul Cyber, was discovered by Scott Helme, founder of the security monitoring service Report URI. Helme checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets his service could find and found 188 of them infected. He warned the real number is likely higher, because he could only examine the snippets he was able to locate in time. The malicious code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment-card details typed into website forms, stole cookies and screenshots, and pushed exploit kits at iPhone and iPad users.

How one trusted script reached 178 organisations at once

Optimizely Web works by asking each customer to load a small JavaScript "snippet" from Optimizely's content delivery network, cdn.optimizely.com, on every page of their site. That snippet lets marketers run experiments and test different versions of a page. It is a design that concentrates enormous trust in one supplier: compromise the snippet, and you compromise every site that loads it.

That is exactly what happened. The poisoned files were served from Optimizely's own domain, carrying a valid Optimizely security certificate, so browsers and most security allowlists treated them as legitimate. Visitors had no visible reason to suspect anything was wrong. (ShiftDelete)

Optimizely confirmed on Tuesday, 17 November, that an attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to plant the malicious code in customer projects. "The vulnerable path is blocked, the injected code was removed, and customers have been contacted directly," the company said in a post on X at 01:21 UTC. (CyberKendra)

What Optimizely has not explained is the central mystery of the incident: how a flaw in a signup flow — the process for creating a new account — gave an outsider write access to the projects of existing, unrelated customers. The company has also not said how many customers were affected in total, when the attacker first gained access, or whether any customer data held by Optimizely itself was accessed.

What the malicious code did to visitors

The payload was a multi-purpose kit, and every part of it was active at once. Its main component was a crypto clipper: it scanned each page for valid wallet addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, checked their checksums, and replaced them with addresses controlled by the attackers — in page text, form fields, links, images, the clipboard, outgoing network requests and even the iOS share sheet. A visitor copying a payment address from a trusted site could have pasted the attacker's address instead, without noticing.

At 13:43 UTC the attackers added a card skimmer. It watched form submissions for a card number, expiry date and security code, then sent the details to the attacker's server at 1688360.cc/card.php. Payment fields hosted by a processor inside a separate frame, such as Stripe or Adyen, were out of its reach; card details typed directly into a site's own form fields were not.

The kit also sent the page URL, browser cookies not marked HttpOnly, the original wallet addresses and a screenshot of the page to the attacker's server. And on Apple devices it pushed the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits at iPhone and iPad users. Researchers have not confirmed that any iPhone was actually compromised, and the presence of the script on a site does not mean every visitor was affected.

Money was already stolen. By 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attackers' wallets had received about $7,040 in cryptocurrency within roughly nine hours, according to Report URI. A later on-chain review by Galaxy Digital's Alex Thorn put the confirmed stolen total lower, at around $2,300 across 19 fraudulent transactions. Stolen funds were swept out to exchanges at around 13:03 UTC. Report URI said it cannot see how many card numbers or cookies reached the attacker's server. (Glonce)

Timeline of the attack

The first injection Report URI found was in the BBC's snippet at 04:21 UTC on 16 November, two hours after the last clean capture. The main malicious script was first seen on bbc.com at 08:28 UTC. The attacker registered the domain 1688360.cc at 05:23 UTC, built the first version of the payload at 08:10 UTC and added the card skimmer at 13:43 UTC.

Most of the code was removed by Monday evening UTC. Report URI found it in 169 infected snippets at 20:56 UTC and in only one — UK broadband provider TalkTalk's — at 21:52 UTC. Optimizely says it has since fixed the flaw, removed the injected code and contacted affected customers directly.

What visitors and website owners should do

Anyone who visited one of the affected sites on 16 November, and especially anyone who paid by card or copied a crypto wallet address that day, should check their bank and card statements for charges they do not recognise and contact their bank about anything suspicious. Crypto users should verify the destination address of any transaction made that day before assuming it went where intended.

Report URI advises Optimizely Web customers to open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code and look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any script they did not write. Seventeen sites with partial protection blocked the card, cookie and screenshot theft by restricting connect-src, but that does not stop address swapping, which happens inside the page itself.

A familiar pattern, and an unanswered question

Supply-chain attacks have become one of the most effective ways to reach millions of people at once: instead of breaking into each target, attackers break into one shared supplier. The pattern echoes other recent incidents, from the court systems hit by a data breach in Arizona to the second wave of cyberattacks on European supermarket refrigeration systems. Security agencies have also been seizing the infrastructure behind state-linked hacking campaigns, as the FBI did with Chinese hacker tools in the Flax Typhoon operation.

One question the industry will keep asking is whether this incident connects to Optimizely's earlier troubles. The company confirmed in February 2026 that attackers had accessed some of its internal systems through a voice-phishing attack, but no researcher has linked that incident to this one. Until Optimizely explains how a signup-flow flaw opened the door to 178 customers' projects, the most important lesson is already clear: a website is only as secure as the third-party scripts it loads on every page.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which websites were affected by the Optimizely attack?

Malicious code was served through Optimizely Web snippets to visitors of 178 organisations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Report URI found 188 infected snippets out of 1,611 it checked, and the real total may be higher.

How did the attackers get into Optimizely?

Optimizely confirmed that an attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects. It has not explained how a signup-flow flaw gave an outsider write access to existing customers' projects, or when the access began.

What did the malware steal?

The code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attackers' own, skimmed card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into sites' own payment forms, stole cookies and page screenshots, and pushed iOS exploit kits at iPhone and iPad users. About $7,040 in crypto reached the attackers' wallets by 19:25 UTC on 16 November, according to Report URI.

I visited an affected site on 16 November — what should I do?

Check your bank and card statements for unrecognised charges and contact your bank about anything suspicious. If you sent cryptocurrency that day, verify the destination address. No iPhone compromise has been confirmed, but iOS users should keep their devices updated.

Is the attack over?

The malicious code was removed from almost all infected snippets by the evening of 16 November UTC, and Optimizely says the vulnerable path is blocked and affected customers have been contacted. The company has not yet said whether any customer data it holds was accessed.